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transfer of learning possibly through setting 
new functional connections between cortex 
and the cerebellum. Although the study by 
Olsson et al. (2008) is limited to the training 
of an elementary motor act, finger tapping, 
the combined training effect of physical and 
mental training, and the transfer effect could 
have important consequences for training 
protocols for athletes in need of improved 
performance in, e.g., jumping or running, 
and for stroke patients participating in reha-
bilitation training programs.
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Emotionally salient events have long been 
shown  to  engage  attentional  resources 
more  than  emotionally  neutral  events 
(Vuilleumier, 2005). In contrast, the recip-
rocal effect that attention also influences 
emotion has remained mostly unexplored 
in  spite  of  everyday  intuition.  Imagine 
yourself sitting at your desk, your thoughts 
immersed  in  formulating  some  complex 
brain  theory.  Suddenly,  the  door  opens 
and an unknown face sticks out asking: Dr. 
Peters? – No, wrong office – you reply. Even 
if the smiling face quickly retreats in silence, 
it already captured your attention away, and 
briefly interrupted the smooth flow of your 
thoughts and actions. Some may find this 
distractor  effect  displeasing,  particularly 
while handling a difficult problem, or if the 
interruption occurs at frequent intervals. In 
a research article published in Frontiers in 
Human Neuroscience, Kiss et al. (2008) have 
made an original contribution to the field 
by means of a novel methodology to exam-
ine the links between attentional selection 
and emotional valuation.
The authors tested the hypothesis that 
human faces would be emotionally deval-
ued and judged as less trustworthy as a 
consequence  of  having  been  designated 
as distractors – hence requiring no overt 
motor response – in a previous selective 
attention procedure. Visual targets and dis-
tractors consisted of exemplars of human 
faces  with  distinct  racial  features,  i.e., 
Caucasian versus Asian faces. Trial blocks 
involved two stages. Firstly, participants saw 
a short series of novel faces, to which they 
responded by pressing a button to faces 
of one race, and refrained from respond-
ing to faces of the other race (Figure 1). 
Secondly,  about  half-a-minute  later,  the 
same faces were judged for trustworthiness 
in a 4-point rating scale. Each face appeared 
only twice, once at response selection, and 
once at the affective evaluation stage, to 
control for familiarity effects. The response 
assignment of target (Go) and distractor 
(Nogo) racial features was reversed halfway 
through the experiment.
Importantly, the neural substrates of dis-
tractor devaluation were also examined. As 
an index of prefrontal inhibitory control, the 
authors measured a negative-going brain 
potential peaking between 250 and 350 ms 
after the onset of Nogo distractors (often 
termed “Nogo N2”). The phasic negativity 
peaks at midfrontal scalp regions and has 
been considered as an   electrophysiological 
correlate  of  anterior  cingulate  function 
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003). The intensity 
of Nogo N2 potentials to distractor faces 
was larger for faces that were rated as less 
trustworthy than for faces judged more pos-
itively. This indicated that the efficiency of 
prefrontal inhibitory control triggered by 
distractor faces covaried with their subse-
quent affective devaluation.
The phenomenon of distractor devalu-
ation was explained from a general inhi-
bition-based account by which the same 
type of inhibitory tagging responsible for 
top-down cognitive control could be gen-
eralized to emotional as well as “percep-
tual, higher cognitive, or response-related 
stages of processing” (Kiss et al., 2008). The Frontiers in Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  May 2009  |  Volume 3  |  Issue 1  |  7
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  proposal stands on evidence that distractor 
devaluation occurs in conditions requiring 
strong attentional inhibition i.e., when tar-
gets and distractors share some perceptual 
features (Figure 1; Fenske and Raymond, 
2006). In spite of its parsimony, however, 
the account does not clarify why efficient 
response  inhibition  to  distractors  does 
not necessarily prevent the disruption of 
concurrent thoughts and actions. Instead, 
probabilistic  stimulus-response  contex-
tual associations can explain behavioral 
distraction and related brain responses in 
terms of transient overloads in working 
memory capacity induced by the distrac-
tors (Barceló et al., 2008). If distractor faces 
induced interference and response con-
flict, there is possibility of transient dips 
being caused in cognitive control whose 
resolution demands prefrontal resources. 
From this perspective, distractor devalua-
tion and the   midfrontal negativities might 
relate  to  the  rather    displeasing  feeling 
of being   temporary out-of-  control. This 
  interpretation concurs with the   clustering 
of   emotional and attentional symptoms 
observed  in  some  frontal  lobe  patients 
(e.g.,  distractibility,  disinhibition  and 
irritability).
This study paves the way to elucidate 
these as well as several other relevant issues 
on the way in which attention influences 
emotion: How does novelty and familiarity 
modulate distractor devaluation? What are 
the specific neural substrates and cognitive 
mechanisms? Can the attentional biases on 
emotional valuation be extended to every-
day life situations such as ethnic empathy 
and  prejudice,  or  sibling  jealousy?  Such 
questions will surely open up rich venues 
for future research.
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Figure 1 | Integrative model of prefrontal function (modified from Miller, 2000). Kiss et al.’s (2008) proposal could be framed within a general model  
of prefrontal inhibitory control by which distractor devaluation might result from attention–emotion interactions at various levels within a hierarchy of neural 
representations. The blue circles denote inhibitory tagging through Nogo pathways encompassing perceptual (s2), motor (r0), and prefrontal cortical units  
(i.e., anterior cingulate), as well as through lower-order intervening sensorimotor pathways involving subcortical and/or other posterior cortical structures.  
Here a color face designates the task-relevant pathways for perception (s1) and action selection (r1). Note that distractor and target faces share perceptual features 
(s3) that can induce interference among competing pathways at higher levels in the hierarchy. The probabilistic activation of Go and Nogo pathways determines  
the relative recruitment of prefrontal resources (Barceló and Knight, 2007), as well as the intensity of midfrontal negativities and related positive-going brain 
potentials (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003). This schematic suggests that efficient response inhibition likely depends on the monitoring of response conflicts, resulting  
in working memory overload and transient loss of cognitive control induced by the distractors (Barceló et al., 2008).